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Abstract
Our digital footprint today spans over a large number of activities on the Web, smart-
phone applications, wearable devices, Online Social Network (OSN) profiles, and the data
collected about our online presence and behaviour by third-party analytics companies. As
well as companies, scientists also often perceive OSNs as a goldmine for research into various
aspects of social behaviour and inter-personal communication. For example, observing social
interaction between individuals, their engagement in conversations, or performing sentiment
analysis on these communications, are often carried out for research in a number of disciplines,
e.g., mental health, sociology, or political predictions. Such studies introduce many challenges
for conducting research in a responsible manner. Data may be repurposed or cross-correlated
in ways that participants may not have anticipated or desired, private information may be
measured or collected, or legal requirements may not be met. In this chapter, we explore some
of the challenges and dilemmas met by industry, academia, regulators, privacy advocates, the
data-driven society, and ultimately the individuals using these online services. We provide
a number of arguments for and against the collection, analysis, and archiving of personal
data specifically for digital research. We conclude by discussing a number of theoretical and
practical approaches that target these dilemmas.
1 We are the data!
We have been gathering Big Data throughout history. Land surveys such as the Domesday Book
or the Napoleonic Cadastre have long been conducted, while a population census of the Roman
Empire is mentioned in the Bible. Of late, however, advances in technology have led to a sharp
fall in the relative costs of gathering data about individuals and their traits, leading to increases
in the so-called “three Vs” (volume, velocity and variety) of Big Data (Laney, 2001). The use of
computers in the systems around us means that data are often generated as a side effect of some
other task. Vehicle detectors in intelligent transport systems can be used for monitoring congestion
or adjusting speed limits, but also for identifying cars or drivers. Smart electricity meters can be
used for charging, but also for correlating usage with social deprivation demographic data. This
extends to individuals themselves, as we increasingly use online social networks (OSNs), and
they become integrated with smartphone applications (apps), and other wearable and Internet
of Things technologies to create new Social Computing applications. These enable people to
collect and generate their own data through the self-reporting of hobbies, interests, activities,
and emotions, but at the same time enable accurate behavioural profiling by gathering browsing
and shopping data from across the web through the use of social widgets (e.g., the Facebook
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like button) and the rich interconnection between analytics and tracking services (Falahrastegar,
Haddadi, Uhlig, & Mortier, 2014).
This increase in the amount and types of data, and the ease at which they can be collected,
has led to a corresponding increase in research based around such data collection, with thousands
of papers published using Facebook alone (Caers et al., 2013). Such research is essential for
improving our understanding of this wide techno-social landscape. Indeed understanding whether
human behaviour has changed psychologically or socially because of the Internet or technology
use could be difficult without collecting such data. These new technologies have also enabled
improvements in new research data collection methods, such as “citizen science” (Silvertown,
2009), while the resultant large quantities of data have enabled new methods of analysis, such as
the so-called “discovery-driven” or “hypothesis-free” research (Aebersold, Hood, & Watts, 2000).
The data collected from people can also be used for societal and individual benefit. For
example, location-based services can be used for predicting journeys, optimising traffic routes,
or public transport services; but the data can also be used for delivering targeted advertising
or providing detailed (or potentially intrusive) location-based services. Increasingly, the data
generated by us, or inferred about us, creates a rich information ecosystem which has benefits and
harms.
In this chapter, we focus on the challenges in conducting responsible and ethical research
when using data collected from OSNs for research purposes, from active volunteers and passive
participants. We discuss the potential benefits and also the potential pitfalls of such digital
research, what it means to conduct responsible research, and the current technical limitations
that might impede our ability to do so. We then describe some best practices, both in terms of
what researchers can do technically, but also legally and socially.
Ethics itself is of course a rather overloaded term (in the computer science sense1), with many
definitions. For this reason some prefer to use the notion of “responsible research” (Owen, Mac-
naghten, & Stilgoe, 2012). But Shamoo and Resnik (2009) offer four definitions of ethics in relation
to research, and for our purposes we focus on the first: “ethics as standards of conduct that distin-
guish between right and wrong, good and bad, and so on”. (Singer, 2011, p. 14) in his well-known
book describes such ethical standards as being somehow decided by considering universal prefer-
ences, and making decisions that are ethical according to “preference utilitarianism”. But ethics
and morality are closely linked (Farrimond, 2013), and when considering preferences, perhaps we
should limit ourselves to moral actors.2 Thus, when discussing the benefits and pitfalls of digital
research, we need to consider the preferences of all actors involved in these systems.
2 The good bits
Many of the previously mentioned examples in this chapter and the book as a whole relate to the
use of big data for understanding aggregate behaviours (e.g., overall road traffic, overall politi-
cal patterns, or statistical distribution of mental or physical health conditions in individuals or
the society). Such data are useful to governments, industry, and researchers aiming to optimise
their services or improving scientific insight in relevant areas. They can be used to identify the
spread of rumours and media in the society (Cha, Pérez, & Haddadi, 2009), or understanding bias
in individuals’ views or those of the media (An, Cha, Gummadi, Crowcroft, & Quercia, 2012).
Similarly, location and picture data from different OSNs such as Instagram and Twitter can be
used to understand the health habits of individuals and communities with respect to issues such
as physical activity and obesity (Widener & Li, 2014; Mejova, Haddadi, Noulas, & Weber, 2015),
finding investors for crowdfunded projects (An, Quercia, & Crowcroft, 2014), or to aid relevant
organisations in providing fast and efficient disaster relief in emergencies (Dı́az, Aedo, & Herranz,
2014; Imran, Castillo, Lucas, Meier, & Vieweg, 2014). Data from OSNs can also be used for rec-
1Overloading is a form of polymorphism where different functions or methods with the same name can be invoked
depending on context. Informally the term can also be used to reference the use of the same term to invoke different
meanings.
2“it is precisely the moral persons who are entitled to equal justice” (Rawls, 1999, p. 442).
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ommending friends, new content, books, and entertainment to individuals using the social plugins
provided by these services (Konstas, Stathopoulos, & Jose, 2009; Seth & Zhang, 2008).
The data collected from these sources can be used for inferring public health (Mejova et al.,
2015; Paul & Dredze, 2011) and physical activity traits (Cavallo et al., 2012), as well as giving
useful feedback and behaviour interventions to individual. The vast amount of data available
from OSNs, complemented by the wealth of personal data obtainable from wearable devices and
smartphones shared online, provide the research community with opportunities bounded only by
consumer willingness, scientific creativity, data access regulations, and ethics (Mortier, Haddadi,
Henderson, McAuley, & Crowcroft, 2014).These range of Social Computing applications often rely
on collection of personally identifiable information (PII) from individuals. Though some services
and organisations mandate ethical approval for dealign with such sensitive data, and some research
fields are developing subject-specific guidelines (Bailey, Dittrich, Kenneally, & Maughan, 2012),
there is as of yet no universally agreed framework for the collection, archiving, and use of personal
information.
The examples above present a glimpse at opportunities and huge potentials in the use of social
media. While we will not spend much longer on the benefits for the individual, or the public, we
encourage the reader to consider the value of these services while reading the rest of this chapter
where we present the challenges and limitations.
3 What could possibly go wrong?
Individuals on OSNs are often attracted by the network effect, with one of the main attractions
being the ability to maintain their relationships with offline friends and family, but beyond these
much useful information can be found through weak ties (Granovetter, 1973) and, from users self-
organising to create well-connected communities (De Meo, Ferrara, Fiumara, & Provetti, 2014).
In doing so, users may inherently divulge a large set of personal information about themselves
(e.g., their location and activity), and their connections (social circles), through time. Researchers
enjoy the wealth and depth of data, the interactions between individuals and organisations, and
content sharing patterns on social media. However collecting this data has potential risks for the
individual using these services as the data can be used to identify small groups or individuals, and
thus potentially expose sensitive information.
Over the past few years several research studies have attracted attention in the media, perhaps
unexpectedly, due to their use of sensitive data, jeopardising individuals’ privacy, or affecting the
participants’ emotional wellbeing. In 2008, a set of university researchers employed students to
help them crawl the Facebook “walls” of an entire undergraduate class (Selwyn, 2009). Similar
research has been conducted by creating fake user profiles in order to collect individuals’ profiles
in certain geographic areas (Viswanath, Mislove, Cha, & Gummadi, 2009; Haddadi & Hui, 2010).
These highlight the vulnerabilities of these OSNs to impersonation and honeypot attempts, though
the intentions may have been scholarly studies.
One of the most well-known examples in this space was the 2014 “emotional contagion” Face-
book/Cornell study (Kramer, Guillory, & Hancock, 2014), which faced much criticism over its legal
and ethical aspects (Schroeder, 2014). This experiment involved tuning the individuals’ newsfeed
based on the sentiment of the posts from their network, and observing the effects of these posts
on their consecutive posts. Participants did not consent to this manipulation, and the Facebook
user agreement was only changed after the experiment to allow this use. The wide public reac-
tion highlighted the broader impact and importance of scientific experiments, and the way their
results are communicated to the public. In similar manner, an earlier Facebook experiment in
2008 received some criticism when the supposedly anonymous study was quickly deanonymised,
revealing sensitive personal and private information (Zimmer, 2010).
Individuals on OSNs, or the Internet in general (e.g., search engines), are often unaware of
the fact that they may be part of an ongoing experiment. The passive data collection from OSNs
poses a level of threat on individuals’ anonymity and privacy. Similarly, research on Internet
openness or social network data mining can lead to ethically unacceptable practices, and may be
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illegal in many jurisdictions and dangerous for individuals which reside in those locations (Wright,
Souza, & Brown, 2011). Sometimes willingness to share OSN data is temporally sensitive(Bauer
et al., 2013; Ayalon & Toch, 2013), though this does not reduce the severity of the risks involved.
Research on mental health issues such as depression (De Choudhury, Counts, & Horvitz, 2013),
sexual orientation, political views, personality, happiness and more personality traits (Kosinski,
Stillwell, & Graepel, 2013) can have consequences on individuals’ employment, relations, and their
personal lives. Future inferences and correlations (data collected today from an individual) may
also be harmful due to dependancy on their future social, economical, or political status.
Anonymisation and de-identification by removing names, or mapping names to IDs, have long
been utilised to release and use OSN and similar data for research purposes. However the de-
anonymisation of Netflix Prize dataset and understanding the privacy risks of models such as
K-anonymity (Sweeney, 2002) lead to widespread exposure of risks in traditional anonymisation
techniques (Narayanan & Shmatikov, 2008; Machanavajjhala, Kifer, Gehrke, & Venkitasubrama-
niam, 2007). Despite further efforts in de-identification, this still remains a challenge for large scale
OSN data usage (Narayanan & Felten, 2014). Location privacy studies have also identified the
ease of predictability of mobility patterns and social ties using mobile phone data (De Domenico,
Lima, & Musolesi, 2013), and linking OSN datasets with other mobility traces can make deidenti-
fication difficult (Ji, Li, Srivatsa, He, & Beyah, 2016). In Section 5 we will discuss some potential
solutions in the literature.
Taking a step back and taking a broader view, we can categorise the risk levels and their
probabilities of occurrence by looking at a number of example threats:
• Psychological harm: from embarrassment at falling for a deceptive experiment, through
being exposed to offensive content, through being trolled or stalked.
• Economic harm: loss of money or property, identity theft, loss of job or reputation as an
affect of content shared on social networks.
• Physical harm: threat to individuals’ lives due to their ideology, political affiliations, or
religious views, based on knowledge gained from social media for personal purposes.
The above examples present just a few of the high risk threat categories to individuals using
OSNs. But what are the challenges and obstacles which need to be overcome to protect individuals
on these services? Are the outcomes and resulting inferences worth the potential risks? Can we
protect against all potential risks, and indeed should we if protecting against a risk makes the
resulting data less beneficial?
4 Technical limitations: can we overcome these?
In the last sections we discussed the pros and cons of using OSNs. One might ask: how can we use
science to protect the individuals from privacy and ethics issues with large scale data analysis, yet
enable us to perform research beneficial to society? In many studies, testing a certain hypothesis
requires thorough understanding of the relationships in a network, or analysing the context and
sentiment of tweets. Hence we need to consider a large number of varying privacy laws and ethics
considerations in order to distinguish between cyber espionage and performing scientific research.
One of the most fundamental analysis techniques used by researchers is the use of graph
analysis techniques on OSN users. Graph techniques can enable understanding of communica-
tion patterns and trends, or the role and influence of individuals in OSNs (Cha, Haddadi, Ben-
evenuto, & Gummadi, 2010; Cha, Benevenuto, Haddadi, & Gummadi, 2012). Yet we are unable to
study the topological characteristics of graphs fully de-identified in a way that some nodes cannot
be de-anonymised and linked back to their neighbours (Narayanan & Felten, 2014; Narayanan
& Shmatikov, 2008). Advances in applications of differential privacy have enabled progress in
this space by achieving a tradeoff between maintaining structural similarity and privacy protec-
tion (Sala, Zhao, Wilson, Zheng, & Zhao, 2011). Other techniques such as homomorphic encryp-
tion, and subsequently secure multi-party computation (Lindell & Pinkas, 2009), have enabled
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some computations to be done on sensitive data (Kocabaş & Soyata, 2014; Torres, Bhattacharjee,
& Srinivasan, 2014). However we are still unable to perform scalable contextual or sentiment anal-
ysis on fully encrypted content or large multi-dimensional datasets while fully preserving privacy.
Full reliance on encryption remain an ideal goal in this space.
It is important to understand that technology does not, and indeed cannot, provide a complete
panacea for many of the challenges and threats that we have outlined. For data to be useful, they
need to be processed. If someone uploads a photo or a status update to an OSN, they expect
that photo to be viewed, or that status to be read. If someone purchases a product based on a
recommendation from an OSN friend, they expect that product to be delivered. It is the processing
of these data that enable some fundamental attacks, as however legitimate data access may be,
the persons to whom access has been granted may renege, and may:
1. re-broadcast data. This problem is well-known to the media industries, as no matter how you
attempt to secure the storage and delivery of music or films, consumers have to be able to play
or view these media at some point. Hence no DRM (Digital Rights Management) scheme,
regardless of complexity or sophistication, has been able to block this “analog hole” (Sicker,
Ohm, & Gunaji, 2007), i.e., been able to prevent people from recording their music coming
out of a headphone jack or speakers. So copyright holders have pursued legal remedies rather
than technological ones.
2. re-identify data. It has been demonstrated that the “power of 4”, e.g., four uses of a credit
card online, or four check-ins on an OSN such as Foursquare or Facebook, is all that is needed
to identify, with a high probability, a unique individual (de Montjoye, Hidalgo, Verleysen, &
Blondel, 2013; de Montjoye, Radaelli, Singh, & Pentland, 2015).
3. re-veal data. Huge data breaches are a regular feature in today’s news.3 This is perhaps an
unsurprising effect of the tendency to store lots of sensitive data in one system. Even though
there may be good intentions for doing so (e.g., efficiencies and better healthcare through
storing health data in a central system), the risks in terms of becoming an attractive target
for attackers, or the total loss of privacy that results from such a data breach, must be
considered.
5 Best practice from a technical perspective
What are the technical solutions to privacy-aware and ethical research on OSNs? How can we
guarantee individuals’ privacy will be respected, their personal data will be protected, and data
can not be used in future for malicious purposes? There have been a number of efforts in privacy-
preserving, or private, information retrieval and analysis. In this section we will discuss a number
of recent approaches to this challenge.
One of the most basic and fundamental responsibilities of researchers dealing with personal
data is to ensure appropriate, role-based, access control measures to databases of personal data
in place when collecting, analysing, and releasing personal data. This basic step would ensure
basic protection against data being accidentally revealed to individuals who were not involved in
the research, data collection or the analysis process. The natural follow-on procedure would be to
perform strong encryption with careful management of decryption keys. These first steps would
substantially raise the bar on effort level for an unintended individual trying to access the data.
Although they may not be effective in protecting the individuals’ identity against the researchers,
or a determined attacker.
More advanced techniques include:
• Data fuzzing and noise addition: The main aim in these techniques is aggregating data and
building distributions in a way that an individual or the relationship between two subjects
3for instance, as we write this chapter, the US Office of Personal Management suffered a data breach that affected
over 21 million people (Davis, 2015)
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can not be identified. Methods such as differential privacy (Dwork, 2006) also provide guar-
antees about the accuracy of results of an analysis independent of an individuals’ inclusion
or exclusion in a database. They hence enable sharing data such as of OSN graphs (Sala et
al., 2011), or addition of noise to survey results (Haddadi, Mortier, & Hand, 2012), without
a major impact on the usefulness of final statistics.
• Data retention/deletion policy: Legislations such as the E.U. Data Protection Directive (Directive
95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protec-
tion of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement
of such data, 1995) introduce rules on collection, use, retention and disposal of personal
data intended for different purposes. In essence, introduction of more strict requirements
such as the Right To Be Forgotten in the E.U. has led to introduction of mechanisms for
individuals to request the removal of some of their digital footprint. Research in online
reputation management and privacy has highlighted the importance of mechanisms for data
deletion (Mayer-Schonberger, 2009).
• Malleable encryption schemes: These schemes provide an ability to perform certain compu-
tations on the ciphertext with results which match those which would have been perfomed on
the raw data. The most important class of these schemes are partial and fully homomorphic
encryption systems (Gentry, 2010). These schemes would allow the data from participants
in research to be encrypted at the collection end by the user, hence limiting the exposure of
sensitive data such as financial records or health data.
• Privacy by Design: Many research or surveying works can be done by limiting the data
collection process in the first place, moving away from the traditional approach of collecting
as much data as possible, in case one might find it useful at a later stage. Often, data
collection and analysis can be performed at the user end, even for research involving resource-
constrained devices such as smartphones or sensors (Haddadi, Hui, Henderson, & Brown,
2011; Lane & Georgiev, 2015). Researchers and data practitioners should ideally assess the
cost-benefit tradeoffs of gathering data in the first place in order to prevent excessive data
collection and processing of sensitive and unnecessary data.
These approaches present some of the ways in which researchers can reduce the unintended
negative consequences of data collection process from OSNs or other sources of personal data. But
are technical solutions ideal? Will they stand the test of time? Or should we expect responsible
research subject to wider scrutiny and transparency?
6 Best practice from a legal and societal perspective
Technical systems can help us to ensure that data are stored or processed appropriately. But to
understand what is appropriate, we need to understand how people, such as research participants,
want their data to be used. Traditionally, researchers have been relying on ethics committee
or Institutional Review Board (IRB) approvals, and informed consent. The notion of informed
consent has long been the standard for determining whether participants’ wishes have been met.
“Informed” consent became enshrined in law in the 1957 Salgo case in the USA, where Martin
Salgo became permanently paralysed in a translumbar aortography, and sued his physicians for
negligence and failing to inform his of the risk of paralysis (Faden & Beauchamp, 1986). The court
in this malpractice case suggested that doctors in such cases have a duty to disclose the risks and
alternatives in treatments, while at the same time acknowledging that doctors should also use
their discretion where appropriate. At the same time, similar ideas about informed consent in
research ethics were first codified in the Nuremberg Code and the Declaration of Helsinki, and
later in documents such as the CIOMS guidelines (Council for International Organizations of
Medical Sciences, 2002), or the EU Data Protection Directive (European Parliament and the
Council of the European Union, 1995). Probabilities of risks involved in de-anonymysation and
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re-identification are not always easily comprehensible by researchers, let alone explainable in plain
every day vocabulary to OSN users taking part in an experiment. On the other hand, it is
not always clear what the role of researchers should be, in case they find legally questionable
information from individuals’ while performing these measurements.
Informed consent has a strong basis in moral theory, specifically the respect for autonomy.
Although it has long been in use in medical ethics, Manson and O’Neill (2007) argue that it
is insufficient. They find that current informed consent requirements are impractical, and that
individual autonomy is only one part of the moral concerns in much research. One of their proposals
is that universal standards for informed consent (e.g., standard forms that apply to all research
situations), are unrealistic. Similarly, there is currently some debate as to whether informed
consent is required for the collection of data from digital systems such as OSNs. Zimmer (2010)
discusses the Facebook T3 study, concluding that people sharing data on an OSN does not give
researchers the right to access those data for research. On the contrary, Solberg (2010) argues that
Facebook research generally does not require ethics approval as it is of low risk. Buchanan, Aycock,
Dexter, Dittrich, and Hvizdak (2011) looks at cybersecurity research, but proposes that we need
a community process to determine standards: “we support a shared responsibility model, where
researchers, REBs, and information technology experts work together to disclose, understand, and
accommodate the unique ethical issues within CS research.” This is akin to Manson and O’Neill
(2007)’s concerns about standards, and the consideration of all actors within RRI.
Even if one does determine that informed consent is required or desired for a particular piece of
research, it is not always clear whether obtaining consent is meaningful if the way in which people
are informed is overly complex (Luger, Moran, & Rodden, 2013), or if, as in the Facebook example
described in Section 3, terms of service may not be clear or even inaccurate (Check Hayden, 2012).
Ioannidis (2013) analyses the claim that consent is meaningless for big data or discovery-driven
research, and argues that we still need consent, in part to maintain trust between researchers and
participants. Luger and Rodden (2013) further distinguish between secured consent, such as the
traditional ticking of a checkbox at the start of an experiment or the acceptance of an EULA (End-
User Licensing Agreement) when installing a piece of software, versus sustained consent, where
participants might be probed in a sustained fashion to determine whether they truly consent to
sharing data (a specific OSN example of this is provided by Sleeper et al. (2013), who studied self-
censorship on Facebook by allowing participants to choose when and what to share with researchers
over time). The need for the latter is borne out by Munteanu et al. (2015), who present a number
of case studies, arguing that the consent process must be examined over the lifecycle of a study,
while Neuhaus and Webmoor (2012) propose “agile ethics”, akin to the agile software engineering
process, where ethical considerations should be evaluated and revisited over time.
Sustained consent can be a burden for participants, who may be discouraged by continuous
requests for consent in addition to requests for data. It may thus affect participation rates or even
fatigue participants such that their consent decisions are incorrect. This has led to recent research
into methods for reducing the burden of sustained consent while still providing more granular
control than secured consent. Morrison, McMillan, and Chalmers (2014) show that allowing
participants to periodically view representations of their data over the course of an experiment
can improve engagement. Hutton and Henderson (2015) employ Nissenbaum (2004)’s framework
of contextual integrity to predict when interactions are likely to violate privacy expectations and
thus require new requests for consent, and show that this is a viable alternative to sustained consent
for OSN studies. Gomer, Schraefel, and Gerding (2014) propose the use of artificial intelligence
agents to achieve what they term semi-autonomous consent, where preferences can be elicited
from participants and agents determine when consent would and would not be granted. Related
approaches to this include the use of machine learning and recommender systems to set privacy
preferences themselves, freeing users from the complex interfaces used for designing privacy policies
in many OSNs (Toch, 2014; Zhao, Ye, & Henderson, 2014, 2016).
One particular concern is how data are used beyond the lifecycle of an experiment. This will
become increasingly common as data sharing becomes mandated by funding bodies (EPSRC, n.d.;
NSF, n.d.). Some participants may have concerns about using their data for other purposes, while
others might welcome their use for some studies but not others. Kaye et al. (2014) recognise this
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Process Techniques
Data collection Proportionate data collection, meaningful consent, pre-processing at source
Data storage user-controlled data aggregation, source-based data anonymisation
Data analysis Differential privacy, homomorphic encryption, Privacy by design
Data release Distribution building, noise addition, differentially private anonymisation
Table 1: Example tools and techniques for best practices in dealing with sensitive data in research
tension through their notion of dynamic consent, whereby participants can be engaged in research
over time, viewing how their data are used and allowing them to consider different contexts for
their data. While proposed for biobank research, it could also be applicable to OSN data.
Beyond the notion of consent to participating in an experiment, we can consider how people
would like to have more control of their data. Current systems enable very little control, with
hardly any transparency about how or when data are collected (e.g., the various data protection
controversies over Google’s Street View data collection using Wi-Fi-enabled cars), or transparency
about how data are processed and transformed (e.g., controversies about how Facebook manipu-
lates users’ news feeds to determine what information to present (Kramer et al., 2014)). We have
proposed that understanding and enabling this control warrants a new research area of its own,
so-called Human-Data Interaction (HDI) (Mortier et al., 2014). As the Internet of Things begins
to be deployed, the amounts of data around us with be ever increasing, including information
about health, well-being, food, home entertainment usage, and more. We need to understand
what people will be willing to share with companies in return for services, or with researchers vol-
untarily, without assuming that they have to give up all of their privacy to allow such technology
into their homes and lives.
Focusing back on legal aspects, another important challenge has been the recent introduction
of the Right To Be Forgotten in Europe, which has enabled individuals to request removal of their
data, or inaccurate articles referring to them, from search engines. Different social media and OSNs
have also been increasingly enabling privacy tools and data removal requests. Some have gone to
the extent of holding researchers responsible for removal of data items from their collections even
long after the data collection has taken place, should an individual request the removal of a social
media posting. Control also extends to legal requirements. For instance, people may wish to keep
their cloud data in particular places, because they do not trust other governments, or because
there are legal requirements that mandate the storing of data in particular jurisdictions (Hon &
Millard, 2013).
The main barrier to treating responsible research and innovation as a purely legal issue is the
often delayed response of the legal system to new advances in technology and the risks they can
present. Hence researchers and scientists need to take into consideration not only legal aspects,
but also ethical considerations, societal impact, and mutual trust when dealing with individuals
data. Table 1 presents some potential tools and techniques for best practices in personal and
social data collection, management, and analysis from OSNs. These are just examples of ways in
which researchers can limit the usage of individuals’ private data beyond the intended scientific
consequences.
7 What challenges and opportunities remain?
Today, OSNs occupy the largest part of screen time for hundreds of millions of Internet users
across the world.4 With high levels of engagement modes, variety of content, and convenience of
data collection mechanisms, these platforms provide the perfect environment for studies of human
behaviour, benchmarking sociology and psychology theories, and opportunities for performing
large scale A/B testing. However there are numerous ethical challenges which need to be considered
4In a recent earnings call, Facebook reported that on average people spend 50 minutes a day on their
sites (D’Onfro, 2016).
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when performing research using OSNs. As shown in this chapter, technical or legal solutions alone
are not enough to prevent privacy disasters or trust misplacement. In essence one organisation
or stakeholder is not enough for protecting the rights of individuals and the ecosystem needs
co-creation of rules between the legal system, technology sector, analytics firms, consumer rights
groups, researchers, and the individuals. As researchers and data practitioners, we also need
develop new ethics framework to comply with new and evolving legal requirements and technical
approaches (e.g., MSR (Bowser & Tsai, 2015)).
Some other challenges exist in the space of ethics-aware and responsible data collection for
research on OSNs, including (not exclusively):
• Making secure systems easy to use (for all stakeholders);
• Communicating risks to ordinary users in simple terminology;
• Obtaining meaningful consent in a fashion that is accurate and yet not burdensome;
• Achieving nearly-perfect, yet feasible and scalable, anonymisation;
• Coping with legacy systems and technologies;
• Establishing the legal duties and liabilities of the researcher;
• Achieving near perfect reliability for Big and Small Data systems;
• Sustaining data and data protection over 100s of years.
Enabling more stringent requirements and tighter controls on data and processes also imply
that people should own their own data. They should be allowed to decide what data are collected
about them and to whom this should be shared, and they should be allowed to monetise these
data, in similar ways to how supermarket loyalty cards work, with clearly identified parties, for
transparent reasons, or through aggregators who turn large amounts of re-identifiable data into
statistical information, using the statistical techniques described in the previous section. For
instance, someone might be happy to share their financial data with service providers for helping
with financial or budgeting assistance, but not to share their health data with these same services.
Conversely, they might be willing to share food consumption data to other interested parties, e.g.,
supermarkets, in return for payment. Availability of a personal cloud, combined with techniques
such as differential privacy, and appropriate use of access control and cryptographic techniques
can all serve to make this work. There have been recently advances in systems and frameworks,
such as OpenPDS (de Montjoye, Shmueli, Wang, & Pentland, 2014) and Databox (Chaudhry et
al., 2015), which aim to enable a user-centric approach to personal data use.
In conclusion, there is an urgent need for the research community to consider personal, societal
and ethical consequences of large-scale use of social media data in order to perform valuable
scientific research without losing the respect and trust of the individuals involved in the ecosystem.
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